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December 2003 I. Introduction 
Given the uncertainty surrounding the returns to investments in human capital, it is not 
surprising that the risk preference of individuals plays a key role in the theory of human 
capital accumulation.
1 By definition, any investment in human capital can be considered 
as risky, since the return is unknown and uncertain. Recent evidence for the U.S. 
suggests that, due to the degree of risk associated with human capital investments, the 
actual gains from higher education per unit of risk are in the region of 5 to 20 per cent 
higher than that from risky financial assets, Palacios-Huerta (2003). The problem is 
exacerbated, as it is not clear how one can reduce the degree of risk associated with 
human capital investment. As pointed out by Shaw (1996), the standard approach to 
reducing risk in financial investment, namely diversification, is often not available in the 
context of human capital. Typically, an individual holds one job with his/her human 
capital investments tailored accordingly.  
Given the obvious problems in measuring risk preference, it is not surprising, 
that attitudes towards risk have attracted very little attention in the empirical literature.
2 
In some empirical models of human capital accumulation, a parameter of constant risk 
aversion has been included,
3 but such an approach clearly does not allow variation in 
risk aversion across individuals to play a role in the investment decision-making 
process. One important exception in the literature is Shaw (1996) who jointly models 
investment in risky human capital and financial wealth allowing for interpersonal 
differences in risk preference. The theoretical framework predicts an inverse relationship 
between an individual’s degree of risk aversion and investment in risky human capital, 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Johnson (1978), Levhari and Weiss (1974) and Gibbons and Murphy (1992).  
2 Some attempts have been made to adjust the returns to schooling for individual risk by estimating 
Mincerian wage equations allowing for random coefficients, which yields dispersion (i.e. risk) in the 
returns to schooling by assigning individual specific returns, Harmon et al. (2003). 
3 Such studies include Brown and Rosen (1987), Moore (1987) and Murphy and Topel  (1987) whilst 
Belzil and Hansen (2002) dispense with this assumption. 
  2which, in turn, impacts upon wage growth. Using U.S. data, Shaw finds that wage 
growth is positively correlated with willingness to invest in risky financial assets such as 
stocks and shares.  
In this paper, we test the theoretical predictions from Shaw’s model using data 
derived from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), as well as extending her 
empirical analysis in a number of important ways. We concentrate upon the 1995 wave 
of the BHPS since there are only two years, 1995 and 2000, when individuals are asked 
detailed questions pertaining to investments held in risky assets such as shares and unit 
trusts. We focus on the information derived from the 1995 wave in order to determine 
how risk preference in 1995 affects estimated returns to human capital and, hence, wage 
growth over three time periods – 1995 to 1996, 1995 to 1998 and 1995 to 2000. We also 
investigate the determinants of wage growth between 2000 and 2001 exploring how risk 
preference in 2000 affects returns to human capital over a one-year time horizon – data 
availability limits the length of time horizon analysed in this case. Our findings suggest 
that less risk averse behaviour impacts positively on the returns to human capital 
investment thereby enhancing wage growth.  
The paper is set out as follows: Section II summarises the theoretical 
underpinnings to our thesis whilst Section III describes the data and methodology. Our 
empirical findings are presented in Section IV whilst final comments and policy 
implications are collected in Section V. 
II. Theoretical Considerations 
In order to place our empirical analysis into context, this section summarises the 
theoretical framework developed by Shaw (1996) [see Shaw, 1996, for full details]. The 
model is based on a portfolio allocation model extended to incorporate an individual’s 
  3decision to invest in risky human capital. The share of current human capital allocated to 
producing new human capital is given by: 
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the variance of the return.
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In order to derive an expression for wage growth, wages at time t are defined as: 
()() ( ) 1 1 1 1 1 − − + − = − = t t t t t t t K s s K s w γ        ( 3 )  
where   denotes human capital at time t  and  t K t γ  represents the productivity of  . 
Hence, wage growth can be expressed as: 
1 − t s
( 1 1 ln ln − + ≈ ∆ t t t s w ) γ           ( 4 )  
Assuming  , small  1 − ≈ t t s s 1 − t ts γ  and that each investor has the same perceptions of 
returns to risky financial investments,
6 wage growth can be expressed as: 
                                                 
4 In Equation 1,  denotes the mean return to human capital investment and  h µ η  denotes the marginal rate 
of substitution between financial wealth and human capital. 
5 In Equation 2,µ  represents the expected return on the risky asset portfolio whilst r represents the risk 
free return. 
6 This is a standard assumption in portfolio theory – in a well-diversified portfolio, the return would be the 
same as that of the market portfolio [see Elton et al., 2003]. 
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where the error term is defined as  ( ) i hi i i u b
2 σ α ε =  and so may not be homoscedastic. 
The intuition underlying Equation 6 is that those individuals who hold large shares of 
risky assets,  i α , will also invest in greater amounts of risky human capital.
7,8 It is 
apparent from Equation 6 that risk-taking as measured by  i α  will augment all estimated 
returns to human capital in the matrix X by the amount ( )
2
hi b σ . Furthermore, risk 
preferences may also influence the returns to human capital indirectly through ( )β σ
2
hi b .  
We therefore aim to explore the determinants of real wage growth focusing on the direct 
and indirect effect of risk preferences via non-linear least squares estimation given the 
nature of the functional form underlying Equation 6. 
III. Data  and  Methodology 
Given that the aim of this paper is to explore how interpersonal variation in risk 
preference affects human capital investment, we require panel data whereby the same 
                                                 
7 Similarly, Guiso et al. (1996) recognise the influence of earnings risk on a household’s demand for risky 
assets and report an inverse relationship between investment in risky assets and income risk. Moreover, it 
is apparent that income risk may be influenced by investment in human capital. 
8 Although the theoretical model predicts a positive association between less risk averse behaviour and 
human capital investment, it is clearly important to explore the empirical validity of this ascertain. It may 
be the case, for example, that individuals who are risk averse are more likely to invest in human capital in 
order to safeguard their future, this provides some intuition to explain an inverse relationship. 
  5individuals are tracked across time enabling us to determine the change in real wages 
experienced by individuals over time and, hence, wage growth at the individual level. 
Our data set is derived from five waves of the BHPS – 1995, 1996, 1998, 2000 and 
2001. This is a random sample survey of each adult member of a nationally 
representative sample of more than 5,000 private households (yielding approximately 
10,000 individual interviews). For Wave one, interviews were conducted during the 
autumn of 1991. The same individuals are re-interviewed in successive waves – the 
latest available being wave twelve in 2002.  
  In contrast to Shaw (1996) who is limited to exploring wage growth over a single 
time period, 1983-1986, the BHPS allows us to explore wage growth over different time 
horizons in terms of both the length of time horizon and in terms of different base years 
(i.e. 1995 and 2000). The fact that we can explore the relationship between risk 
preferences, human capital investment and wage growth over different time periods and 
time horizons is particularly important due to a number of reasons. It may be the case, 
for example, that risk preferences vary over time or the impact of risk preferences may 
not be time invariant. On the other hand, both the propensity and the opportunity to 
invest in human capital or risky financial capital may be sensitive to particular time 
periods. This may be due to changes in individuals’ circumstances relating to, for 
example, marital or employment status. Hence, the BHPS is well-suited to our purposes 
as, in contrast to the data set analysed by Shaw (1996), it provides us with an 
opportunity to explore the importance of the time dimension in the relationship between 
risk preference, human capital accumulation and wage growth. 
We initially concentrate upon the 1995 wave since there are only two years in 
which individuals are asked detailed questions pertaining to investments held in risky 
  6assets such as shares and unit trusts – 1995 and 2000.
9 We use information derived from 
the 1995 wave in order to determine how investments held in risky assets in 1995 affect 
estimated returns to human capital and, hence, wage growth over the periods 1995 to 
1996 (first difference), 1995-1998 (third difference) and 1995-2000 (fifth difference). To 
evaluate the impact of risk preference upon human capital investment we only require 
information on risk preference in the base year, 1995. Although, Equation 6 is a growth 
equation and so wages are differenced, all explanatory variables relate to the base year. 
We explore wage growth over different time horizons in order to ascertain the 
robustness of our findings and, in addition, to determine their stability over different 
wage growth horizons. We also explore the implications of specifying a different base 
year – namely 2000 – although we restricted our analysis to a one-year growth horizon 
in this case, with all explanatory variables pertaining to the base year, 2000. 
Our sample consists of individuals in employment aged between 16 and 65. We 
exclude the self-employed, agricultural workers and individuals with more than one job. 
After conditioning on individuals who have data responses on the investment questions 
which are of key interest to our study, the sample sizes for the three growth periods with 
the 1995 base year are 3,105 for the first difference sample, 2,441 for the third 
difference sample and 2,294 for the fifth difference sample, whilst the sample size is 
2,170 in the case of the first difference sample with the 2000 base year. 
The empirical counterpart to Equation 6, which forms the basis of our empirical 
investigations, is as follows: 
() [] i i i i i
d Share Asset w ε γ β π + + = ∆ H X
' ln                    (7) 
                                                 
9 Banks et al. (2002) use the 1995 and 2000 waves from the BHPS to provide a descriptive investigation 
of the distribution of financial wealth over the period. 
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The dependant variable, the relevant difference in log real hourly wages 
according to the time period under investigation, is derived from usual gross pay per 
month from current job divided by usual monthly hours. We replace  i α  in Equation 6 
with the variable  , which represents the proportion of net wealth held in 
investments which, according to the theoretical framework, is inversely related to risk 
aversion.
i Share Asset
10,11 Our measure of risk aversion,  , is defined as follows: i Share Asset
12 
i i
i
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Figures 1 to 8 present the distribution of   across our four growth samples as 
well as for only those employees reporting positive asset shares.  
i Share Asset
<<FIGURES 1 TO 8 HERE>> 
It is apparent from Figures 1, 2, 3 and 7 that the large majority of employees have zero 
asset shares in accordance with the findings of Shaw (1996) for the U.S. In the following 
section, we explore whether the skewness of   towards a uniform mass point 
of zero impinges on our results. 
i Share Asset
                                                 
10 Shaw (1996) also measures risk aversion via survey information whereby individuals were asked about 
their attitudes towards financial risk. Such information however is not available in the BHPS. 
11 Investments comprises of shares, personal equity plans, unit trusts and other investments such as 
government and company securities. 
12 We have experimented with various definitions of the asset share variable including definitions 
incorporating housing wealth and debt. Our findings, which are available from the authors on request, are 
robust to such changes. 
  8Turning to the measures of human capital specified in the matrix, X, the BHPS, 
in contrast to the data set exploited by Shaw (1996), provides information on highest 
education qualifications rather than relying on a simple years of school index. We also 
control for labour market experience entered in a quadratic form as well as the extent of 
job turnover within the relevant sample period. 
Also included in the model apart from human capital variables are other controls, 
given in the matrix H, which are likely to influence wage growth such as occupation, 
industrial affiliation and regional location (with 8, 8 and 10 categories respectively), as 
well as demographic characteristics such as gender, marital status and ethnicity. We also 
control for other factors related to employment such as trade union membership and the 
type of employment contract held by the individual. The inclusion of contract type 
captures the effects of other types of risk akin to the theoretical model of Caroli and 
Garcia-Peñalosa (2002). To summarise, the H matrix contains a much richer array of 
control variables than that specified by Shaw (1996). 
Full summary statistics for all of the variables used in our empirical analysis are 
presented in Tables 1A, for the different time horizons and base years with information 
in the first column stating where each variable is assigned in terms of the X or H matrix. 
Clearly across the different samples the average share of investments is around 25 per 
cent.  Table 1B presents summary statistics of the asset share variable by educational 
attainment for 1995 and 2000. 
<<TABLES 1A & 1B HERE>> 
Across each of the three time horizons for the 1995 sample, it is apparent that those 
individuals with higher educational qualifications are characterised by a larger asset 
share suggesting a positive correlation between investment in human capital and 
investment in risky financial assets. For example, those individuals with A levels or 
  9GCSE grades A-C have asset shares similar to the overall mean, whilst the asset share 
rises to 33% for those individuals who possess a degree. The figures for 2000 follow a 
similar pattern with the asset share variable being positively correlated with educational 
attainment. 
IV. Results 
In the following discussion, we focus on the key results of interest, which are shown in 
the shaded areas of Tables 2 to 5.
13 Table 2 below presents the results of estimating 
Equation 7 across the three different wage growth horizons with a base year of 1995 in 
the first three columns and a base year of 2000 in the final column allowing for 
heterogeneity in risk aversion at the individual level.
14,15 
<<TABLE 2 HERE>> 
The estimated coefficient on the asset share variable, our measure of risk preference is 
statistically significant and positive across each period. The sign of the estimated 
coefficient of the asset share variable suggests that those individuals who are willing to 
make greater financial investments experience higher rates of wage growth. 
Furthermore, it is apparent that the return to risk-taking increases monotonically across 
the growth horizons.
16 
The estimated coefficients on the educational attainment variables represent the 
second indirect effect stemming from interactions between risk preference and the 
returns to human capital. A striking feature from the results reported in Table 2 is that  
                                                 
13 The controls in Tables 2, 4 and 5 consist of industry, occupational and regional dummy variables, each 
jointly significant at the 1 per cent level. 
14 In order to allow for identification of the π and  β ’s, we normalise on the ‘no education’ category. 
15 For all of the results which follow, the error term  ( ) i hi i i u b
2 σ α ε =  (see Section II) has to be tested for 
heteroscedasticity where throughout the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity cannot be rejected at the 1 
per cent level. 
16 The coefficients on the asset share variable are significantly different between the first and third 
difference samples and the first and fifth difference samples with F-Statistics, F(1, 3059)=4.74 and F(1, 
3059)=21.60, respectively suggesting that there is an important time dimension to the analysis. 
  10the returns to low education are generally larger than the returns to high education, 
although the returns to education are positive for all levels of educational attainment. 
For example, the return to a degree and GCSE grades below C are significantly different 
at the 1 per cent level. When interpreting the results, it is important to acknowledge that 
this is not a wage equation but a wage growth model and also that the returns to 
education are in effect non-linear interactions with the individual risk preference 
variable. The returns from human capital investment for risk lovers who initially have 
relatively low levels of educational attainment are greater than that for those with 
relatively high levels of educational attainment, for instance GCSE versus degree. This 
may reflect the fact that those with low educational attainment are willing to take greater 
risks or that they have greater scope for investment in human capital.
17  
Similarly, when one interprets the experience terms, which are interacted with 
risk preference, it is important to acknowledge that we are estimating a wage growth 
model. Hence, our results imply that the returns to risk-taking diminish as experience 
increases. It is surprising to note that the estimated coefficient on the turnover variable 
which captures the effect of job moving on wage growth, is positive yet insignificant.
18 
Turning to the variables entering the H matrix, males appear to experience higher 
wage growth than females. Immigrants have significantly greater wage growth in the 
                                                 
17 To explore these issues more fully, we split our sample into a high education group (degree and further 
education only) and a low education group (A level and below), yielding sample sizes of 877 and 1,417 
respectively. We then estimate Equation 7 for the fifth difference wage growth period for each sample 
separately. To allow identification the omitted categories are ‘further’ and ‘no education’ respectively. 
 Degree A  level GCSE  A-C GCSE  <C 
High 1.019  13%  –  –  – 
Low –  1.078  11%  1.227  15%  1.428  16% 
The results, along with the percentage change in coefficient compared to column 1 in Table 2, are 
summarised above, with all the coefficients shown above significant at the 5 per cent level or above. It is 
apparent that the greatest percentage change is for the lower education group, thus confirming our a priori 
expectations that those with the lower levels of educational attainment are faced with greater scope for 
investment in human capital.  
18 We have also explored the proposition that individuals with positive turnover, i.e. job-movers, are 
relatively more risk loving than those who stay in the same firm, as asserted by Shaw (1996). The findings 
suggested that the risk preferences of those individuals who move are biased in favour of risk-loving 
behaviour in terms of the intercept effect, in accordance with Shaw’s findings. 
  11first and third difference models whilst married individuals experience lower wage 
growth, which is significant across third and fifth difference time horizons. In 
accordance with Shaw (1996), trade union membership impacts negatively on wage 
growth. We also investigate whether having a permanent contract impinges upon wage 
growth. This variable may also be capturing attitudes towards risk following the 
argument put forward by Caroli and Garcia-Peñalosa (2002). We discover, however, that 
this variable only exerts a significant negative effect in the third difference specification, 
which may reflect the length of fixed term contracts. Finally, our results suggest that 
firm size impacts in a positive yet diminishing fashion on wage growth. 
Turning to the first difference sample for 2000-2001, in the final column of 
Table 2, we explore how investments held in risky financial assets in 2000 affect 
estimated returns to human capital and, hence, wage growth over this period. It is 
apparent that the findings tie in with those for the 1995 base year – although the 
estimated coefficient on the asset share variable is much more pronounced for this more 
recent growth period. 
Extensions 
We attempt to address three shortcomings with the Shaw (1996) analysis by extending 
the empirical analysis in three distinct ways. Firstly, we endogenise the asset share 
variable in order to control for potential income effects. Secondly, we restrict our 
analysis to those with a positive asset share only controlling for sample selection bias. 
Finally, we incorporate recent investments in human capital into the framework. In each 
extension, for reasons of brevity we restrict our analysis to the fifth difference sample 
only. 
A potential problem with the empirical analysis so far is that one could argue 
that we are simply picking up an income effect. That is, those individuals who hold risky 
  12financial assets have higher wages and so experience greater wage growth. For instance, 
if wage growth is correlated with high levels of income, and high-income individuals are 
risk takers, then the impact of risk attitudes upon wage growth could simply imply a 
wage-income correlation rather than a relationship between risk preference and wage 
growth. This is essentially a problem of endogeneity bias. We would argue against this, 
however, on the grounds that we enter risk-preferences in levels into a wage growth, i.e. 
differenced, equation. Hence we are not estimating a relationship between the change in 
asset share (potentially an income effect) and wage growth. Although such issues are not 
explicitly discussed by Shaw (1996), we subject our analysis to further scrutiny by 
instrumenting the asset share variable.  
Following Guiso et al. (1996), we regress asset share upon a quadratic in age, 
income and other controls given in the matrix Z - the results are shown in Table 3.
19 We 
then take the predicted values from this model,  φ ˆ A ˆ
i i Z = , and estimate the wage growth 
equation in fifth differences: 
i i
*
i Share Asset ω φ + = Z          (9a) 
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() [] i i i i i
' A ˆ w ε γ β π + + = ∆ H X ln 
5         (9c) 
The results of estimating Equation 9a are shown in Table 3 whilst the estimates from 
Equation 9c are shown in Table 4. The specification we report in Table 3 is similar in 
design to that of Guiso et al. (1996, 2003). The results from estimating Equation 9c are 
shown in the first column of Table 4 and demonstrate that the asset share variable again  
                                                 
19 We specify a tobit model given the truncated nature of the asset share variable. 
  13has a positive and significant estimated coefficient – although its magnitude is much 
more pronounced. In terms of the human capital interactions, our findings suggest that 
there are positive indirect effects from risk taking behaviour. In addition, there is still 
evidence of lower returns for high educational attainment vis à vis low educational 
attainment – for instance degree versus GCSE grades below C, which are significantly 
different at the 1 per cent level. 
<<TABLES 3 AND 4 HERE>> 
Our next extension concerns the fact that, in accordance with Shaw (1996), we 
find that the large majority of employees in our sample have zero asset shares. In 
contrast to Shaw (1996), however, we explore whether this skewness towards the 
uniform mass point of zero for assets impinges upon our findings. Restricting our 
sample to those employees reporting positive asset shares only yields a sample size of 
667. The distributions of the asset share variable across each of the three time horizons 
are depicted in Figures 4, 5, 6 and 8. 
We replicate the fifth difference results presented in Table 2 for those individuals 
reporting positive asset shares controlling for sample selection by incorporating an 
inverse mills ratio into our analysis, which controls for the probability of having a 
positive asset share.
20 The positive estimated coefficient on the asset share variable 
remains albeit at a lower level of significance and magnitude. Interestingly, the 
interactions with the educational attainment variables are now relatively larger with the 
exception of the ‘other’ category. Finally, the estimated coefficient on the sample  
 
                                                 
20 In order to control for sample selection bias, we specify a probit model with the dependant indicating 
whether an individual has a strictly positive asset share – the explanatory variables include a combination 
of personal and job characteristics. In general, the sample selection equation is well-specified with a chi-
squared statistic of 282 (degrees of freedom 44). The full results of the sample selection equation are 
available from the authors on request. 
  14selection term is positive and significant indicating that its exclusion would bias our 
results downwards. 
The final issue that we address concerns a key assumption underlying the 
theoretical model of Section II where attitudes towards risk in period t (1995) are 
assumed to reflect an individual’s preferences at the time of human capital accumulation 
which may have occurred at some period t-h. It is surprising that Shaw (1996) does not 
allude to this concern. The problem is exacerbated as our risk measure in 1995, akin to 
that of Shaw, coincides with human capital already accumulated. However, this is not an 
issue if risk preference is time invariant.  
Our results from instrumenting the asset share (see Table 3) indicate that the age 
terms have a significant effect suggesting that risk preferences may not be time 
invariant. It is apparent, however, from the size of the estimated coefficients that the 
marginal effects are relatively small indicating that the extent to which preferences vary 
over time may not be particularly important.
21 For example, for every additional ten 
years of age, the asset share increases by 0.74%, where the mean asset share is 25% 
suggesting that the impact of age is somewhat limited.
22 Although these findings may 
justify our methodology, we subject our analysis to further scrutiny in two ways. Firstly, 
if risk preferences are time invariant then there should be a relationship between asset 
share in 1995 and wage growth in periods prior to 1995. Similarly, such a relationship 
should exist between the asset share variable in 2000 and wage growth in periods prior 
to 2000. Secondly, we explore the influence of recent investments in human capital upon 
wage growth.  
                                                 
21 Using data for the USA, Haliassos and Bertaut (1995) found risk preferences to be time invariant. More 
recently, Guiso et al. (2003) have also found risk preferences, measured by asset share, to be time 
invariant in a number of countries. 
22 We have also estimated an asset share equation based upon data from 2000. Interestingly, the age 
coefficients were insignificant again suggesting time invariance of risk preferences. 
  15In the first column of Table 5, we report the results of estimating Equation 7 for 
wage growth between 1991 and 1995.
23 It is evident that both the direct and indirect 
effects of risk preference are significant lending further support for the proposition that 
risk preferences are relatively stable across time. Similarly, we estimate Equation 7 for 
the period 1995-2000 with 2000 set as the base year. The findings, which are presented 
in the second column of Table 5, indicate that the direct effect of risk preferences is 
remarkably similar to that presented in Table 2 for the fifth difference sample when 
1995 is set as the base year, although the returns to education are more pronounced in 
Table 5. Thus, our findings suggest that risk preferences may be time invariant. 
<<TABLE 5 HERE>> 
Turning to current investments in human capital, our proxy for risk preference 
relates to investment in risky financial assets in 1995, hence we explore the effect of 
recent human capital investment. This is particularly important as educational attainment 
may reflect human capital investments made sometime ago. To do this, we include a set 
of dummy variables to capture whether an individual reports additional educational 
qualifications between 1995 and 2000 in terms of GCSEs (grades < C and grades A-C), 
A levels, further education, degree level education or vocational qualifications. We also 
control for whether the individual reports that they have received during this time period 
either employer training or non-employer training. Finally, we control for whether the 
individual or his/her family incurred the financial costs of any training courses.  
The results are shown in the last column in Table 5. Once again, our findings 
with respect to the asset share and educational variables are largely unchanged. In 
addition, the variables capturing additional investments in human capital are 
insignificant with the exception of the recent acquisition of a degree. Thus, our findings 
                                                 
23 This is a fourth difference specification, because 1991 was the first year of the BHPS  so a fifth 
difference horizon was not possible. 
  16appear to be robust to controlling for recent investments in human capital in terms of 
both educational qualifications and job training. 
V. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have explored how interpersonal variation in risk preference affects 
human capital investment and, hence, wage growth. We have investigated the link 
between risk preference and wage growth using data from five waves of the BHPS. In 
general, our findings suggest that those individuals who are willing to take greater risks 
experience higher rates of wage growth. Moreover, we have found that this result is 
particularly robust in terms of both changes to the underlying empirical specification as 
well as changes to the sample of individuals analysed. Furthermore, in contrast to the 
previous work in this area, the BHPS has enabled us to explore the relationship between 
human capital, risk preference and wage growth over different time horizons as well as 
at different points in time. The time dimension to our analysis is particularly important 
as individuals’ circumstances clearly may be subject to change over time, which may 
impact upon risk preferences as well as opportunities to invest in risky human or 
financial capital. 
To date, there has been a distinct lack of empirical research in this area in spite 
of the fact that any link between risk aversion and wage growth should be of key interest 
to policy makers - especially if the presence of risk aversion deters individuals from 
investing in risky human capital. The existence of such a deterrent to investing in human 
capital may serve to erode productivity and hence may exert adverse effects on 
economic growth. This would be akin to the argument put forward by Lucas (1988) who 
linked human capital accumulation to productivity and economic growth.  
  17In addition, our findings may have implications for income distribution – if risk 
preference and wage growth are correlated, then the variability of risk preference and 
changes in the composition of assets over time (see Banks et al., 2002) should impact 
upon the distribution of income. Moreover, our results suggest that risk preference 
influences the returns to human capital across different educational groups, hence risk 
preferences and how they affect human capital accumulation may be important in 
explaining recent increases in international wage inequality, Machin and Van Reenen 
(1998). 
Finally, our findings should add to the current debate on the funding and access 
to higher education especially in the context of the proposed reforms to the funding for 
higher education in the U.K. which have been designed to alter the social mix of 
students to encourage participation amongst lower socio economics groups, Greenaway 
and Haynes (2000). If it is the case that risk-aversion is concentrated amongst the lower 
socio-economic groups, then our framework predicts that such individuals may be 
unlikely to invest in human capital given the current funding system. Interestingly, 
recent evidence for the U.S. suggests that the losses to lower education (high school) per 
unit of risk relative to risky financial returns are in excess of 15 per cent, Palacios-
Huerta (2003). Thus, such findings suggest that frictions may be present at lower levels 
of education. 
  If there is an association between risk-aversion and human capital accumulation 
then ways in which individuals’ risk preferences could be influenced may have wide 
reaching effects. For example, if risk-aversion is due to information asymmetries, or in 
the case of higher education varies by socio-economic group, it may be reduced through 
specific training or education. Moreover, such training or education could directly affect 
  18productivity as well as exerting an indirect influence on an individual’s willingness to 
take risks.   
Given the importance of such findings for policymaking, it is surprising that 
there is a distinct lack of research in this area. Hopefully our findings may serve to 
stimulate further research on the relationship between risk preference, human capital 
accumulation and wage growth. 
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Figure 8: Asset Distribution: 1
st Difference 2001-2000TABLE 1A: Summary Statistics 
    BASE YEAR = 1995  BASE YEAR = 2000 
   5
TH DIFFERENCE  3
RD DIFFERENCE  1
ST DIFFERENCE  1
ST DIFFERENCE 
   Mean Min Max Mean Min Max Mean Min Max Mean Min Max 
∆W  Log  Wage  Growth                          0.1437 -2.1707 2.3493 0.0811 -2.1655 3.3347 0.0337 -2.2742 2.669 0.1436 -2.1707 2.3493
X  Asset Share  0.2530  0  1  0.2489  0  1  0.2459  0  1  0.3081  0  1 
X  Experience      23.9425 2  50  24.444  2  57  24.728  3  57  23.9880  2  50
X  Experience Squared/10  69.1342  1  250  72.826  1  325  75.318  1  325  69.2001  0.4  250 
X  Turnover 1.3001        0  6  1.5422 0  5  0.3449 0  1  1.3991  1  5
X  Degree                 0.1622 0 1  0.1536 0 1  0.1623 0 1  0.1760 0  1
X  Further Education  0.2201  0  1  0.2204  0  1  0.2113  0  1  0.3124  0  1 
X  A Level  0.1417  0  1  0.1381  0  1  0.1356  0  1  0.1175  0  1 
X  GCSE Grades A-C  0.2419  0  1  0.2392  0  1  0.2351  0  1  0.1945  0  1 
X  GCSE Grades <C  0.0488  0  1  0.0537  0  1  0.0473  0  1  0.0419  0  1 
X  Other Qualification  0.0497  0  1  0.0442  0  1  0.0489  0  1  0.0406  0  1 
X  No Qualifications  0.1356  0  1  0.1487  0  1  0.1568  0  1  0.1171  0  1 
X  Recent Degree  –  –  –  –  –  –  –  –  –  0.0244  0  1 
X  Recent Further Education  –  –  –                  – – – – – – 0.2507 0 1
X  Recent A Level  –  –  –  –  –  –  –  –  –  0.0955  0  1 
X  Recent GCSE A-C  –  –  –  –  –  –  –  –  –  0.0074  0  1 
X  Recent GCSE <C  –  –  –  –  –  –  –  –  –  0.0017  0  1 
X  Recent Vocational  –  –  –  –  –  –  –  –  –  0.0227  0  1 
X  Recent On- Job Training  –  –  –  –  –  –  –  –  –  0.5915  0  1 
X  Recent Off-Job Training  –  –  –  –  –  –  –  –  –  0.1482  0  1 
X  Paid for Recent Education  –  –  –  –  –  –  –  –  –  0.1007  0  1 
H  Male 0.5078                  0 1  0.5031 0 1  0.4969 0 1  0.5088 0 1
H  White                  0.9690 0 1  0.9644 0 1  0.9701 0 1  0.9705 0 1
H  Immigrant        0.0462 0  1  0.0537 0  1  0.0493  0  1  0.0452  0  1
H  Married                  0.7576 0 1  0.7587 0 1  0.7424 0 1  0.8009 0  1
H  Trade Union  0.3418  0  1  0.3449  0  1  0.3339  0  1  0.3576  0  1 
H  Firm Size 1-24  0.2847  0  1  0.2868  0  1  0.2937  0  1  0.2912  0  1 
H  Firm Size 25-99  0.2650  0  1  0.2642  0  1  0.2612  0  1  0.2424  0  1 
H  Firm Size 100-499  0.2668  0  1  0.2671  0  1  0.2651  0  1  0.2654  0  1 
H  Permanent Contract  0.9477  0  1  0.9501  0  1  0.9485  0  1  0.9493  0  1 
 Observations          2,294 2,441 3,105 2,170 TABLE 1B: Summary Statistics: Asset Share by Education 
BASE YEAR =1995  BASE YEAR = 2000 
 5
TH DIFFERENCE  3
RD DIFFERENCE  1
ST DIFFERENCE  1
ST DIFFERENCE 
  Obs Mean Obs Mean Obs Mean Obs Mean 
Degree                  372 0.3338 375 0.3205 504 0.3319 382 0.4221
Further Education  505  0.2727  538  0.2792  656  0.2502  678  0.3166 
A Level  325  0.2508  337  0.2361  421  0.2263  255  0.2822 
GCSE grades A-C  555  0.2581  584  0.2532  730  0.2552  422  0.3216 
GCSE grades <C  112  0.1429  131  0.1281  147  0.1403  91  0.1863 
Other Qualification  114  0.2318  108  0.2966  152  0.2646  88  0.1992 
No Qualifications  311  0.1649  368  0.1679  495  0.1841  254  0.1986 
Observations  2,294    2,441 3,105  2,170 
  TABLE 2: Wage Growth across Different Time Horizons and Base Years 
  BASE YEAR = 1995  BASE YEAR = 2000 
5
TH DIFFERENCE  3
RD DIFFERENCE  1
ST DIFFERENCE  1
ST DIFFERENCE 
π ˆ                          
Asset Share  0.4645  ***  (3.83)  0.2928  ***  (2.96)  0.1416  **  (2.04)  0.5033  ***  (4.32) 
β π ˆ ˆ ×                          
Experience  -0.0709  ***  (6.36)  -0.0433  ***  (3.26)  -0.0723  ***  (3.33)  -0.0738  ***  (6.29) 
Experience Squared  0.0099  ***  (4.25)  0.0044    (1.49)  0.0113  ***  (2.59)  0.0103  ***  (4.61) 
Turnover  0.0004    (0.04)  0.0528    (0.83)  0.2978    (1.20)  -0.0133    (0.27) 
Degree  0.8993  ***  (6.32)  0.5663  ***  (2.96)  0.7915  ***  (2.93)  0.9677  ***  (7.21) 
Further  0.8790  ***  (6.53)  0.5881  ***  (3.17)  1.0559  ***  (3.55)  0.9798  ***  (7.79) 
A level  0.9674  ***  (6.37)  0.7974  ***  (4.03)  0.8837  ***  (2.93)  1.0905  ***  (6.88) 
GCSE Grades A-C  1.0659  ***  (7.15)  0.9405  ***  (5.21)  1.1037  ***  (3.68)  1.0362  ***  (7.66) 
GCSE Grades <C  1.2313  ***  (4.66)  0.5319    (1.59)  0.9359  *  (1.85)  1.2469  ***  (5.13) 
Other Qualification  0.9745  ***  (4.90)  0.8227  ***  (3.27)  0.9975  ***  (2.58)  0.8428  ***  (3.95) 
γ ˆ                          
Male            0.0375  (2.03)  0.0037 (0.23)  0.0242 (2.06)  -0.0159 (0.84) 
White             0.0939  (2.32)  0.1123 (3.33)  -0.0009 (0.03)  0.1058 (2.51) 
Immigrant           0.0268    (0.65)  0.0689 (2.07)  0.0532 (2.11)  0.0115 (0.27) 
Married           -0.0860    (4.57)  -0.0363 (2.22)  -0.0058 (0.49)  -0.0533 (2.62) 
Trade Union  -0.0883    (4.65)  -0.0581         (3.52)  -0.0138 (1.14)  -0.0179 (0.96) 
Firm Size 1-24  0.0939    (3.80)  0.0812         (3.78)  0.0198 (1.26)  -0.0480 (1.99) 
Firm Size 25-99  0.0673    (2.78)  0.0595         (2.82)  0.0080 (0.51)  0.0267 (1.09) 
Firm Size 100-499  0.0467    (1.95)  0.0442         (2.11)  -0.0021 (0.14)  0.0206 (0.86) 
Permanent Contract  -0.0102    (0.30)  -0.0665         (2.28)  -0.0244 (1.13)  -0.0161 (0.47) 
Controls  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Observations          2,294 2,441 3,105 2,170
Adjusted R squared  0.1675  0.0869  0.0213  0.1658 
 
 
***, **,* denotes 1, 5 and 10 per cent significance respectively shown only for key coefficients. π ˆ  and   show the direct and indirect impact of risk preference upon 
wage growth.
β π ˆ ˆ ×TABLE 3: Asset Share Model, 1995 
  COEFFICIENT              T STATISTIC 
Intercept        -2.9314  *** (5.93) 
Age        0.0739 ***   (3.16) 
Age Squared    -0.0008  **    (2.55) 
Male        0.0899   (1.34) 
White          0.0633 (0.32) 
Immigrant          0.0449 (0.29) 
Married          -0.1407 ** (1.96) 
Permanent Contract    0.0415      (0.30) 
Log Real Wage    0.1957  ***    (2.64) 
Log Unearned Income    0.0188  ***    (5.44) 
Firm Size 1-24    -0.0645      (0.83) 
Firm Size 25-99    -0.0057      (0.07) 
Firm Size 100-499    -0.0226      (0.25) 
Log Windfalls    0.0372  ***    (3.89) 
Own Home    0.1224      (1.46) 
Controls  
Occupation        yes [8] ***
Region        yes [10] ***
Expectations#        yes [6] ***
Observations    2,294
Left Censored  1,627 
Adjusted R squared  0.0696 
 
***, ** denotes 1 and 5 per cent significance respectively.  
# expectations dummy variables capture individuals’ expectations regarding their future financial situation 
 
 
 
  TABLE 4: Instrumentation and Positive Asset Share Restriction (Base Year = 1995) 5
th Difference 
    INSTRUMENTED ASSET  POSITIVE ASSET SHARE 
π ˆ              
Asset Share  1.0323  ***  (4.63)  0.2519  *  (1.65) 
β π ˆ ˆ ×              
Experience  -0.0674  ***  (5.45)  -0.1014  **  (2.53) 
Experience Squared  0.0089  ***  (4.74)  0.0137  **  (2.31) 
Turnover  0.0177    (0.35)  0.0625    (0.33) 
Degree  0.8864  ***  (11.01)  1.2915  ***  (2.86) 
Further  0.9173  ***  (13.40)  1.0681  ***  (3.33) 
A level  0.9051  ***  (12.42)  1.1328  ***  (3.19) 
GCSE Grades A-C  0.9058  ***  (14.03)  1.2779  ***  (3.28) 
GCSE Grades <C  0.9209  ***  (9.28)  1.5849  **  (2.54) 
Other Qualification  0.7485  ***  (7.20)  0.7895  **  (2.18) 
γ ˆ              
Male     0.0168    (0.92)  0.0235 (0.67) 
White     0.0881    (1.71)  0.0406 (0.41) 
Immigrant       0.0272   (0.64)  0.0421 (0.52) 
Married       -0.0190   (0.99)  -0.0459 (1.24) 
Trade Union  -0.0752    (4.05)  -0.0661   (1.90) 
Firm Size 1-24  0.0898    (3.71)  0.0068   (0.15) 
Firm Size 25-99  0.0664    (2.81)  0.0024   (0.05) 
Firm Size 100-499  0.0467    (1.98)  0.0353   (0.83) 
Permanent Contract  0.0151    (0.43)  0.1371   (1.83) 
Inverse Mills Ratio    –    0.4628  (2.34) 
Controls  yes  yes 
Observations      2,294 667
Adjusted R squared  0.2161  0.1587 
 
***, **,* denotes 1, 5 and 10 per cent significance respectively shown only for key coefficients. π ˆ  and   show the   β π ˆ ˆ ×
direct and indirect impact of risk preference upon wage growth. 
 
 
 
 TABLE 5: Time Invariant Risk Preferences and Recent Human capital Investment 
  TIME INVARIANT RISK PREFERENCES    RECENT  HUMAN  CAPITAL
TH DIFFERENCE: 
1991-1995 (BASE YEAR = 1995) 
5
TH DIFFERENCE: 
1995-2000 (BASE YEAR = 2000) 
5
TH DIFFERENCE: 
1995-2000 (BASE YEAR =1995) 
π ˆ                    
Asset Share  0.2547  ***  (2.71)  0.4493  ***  (3.95)  0.4059  ***  (3.08) 
β π ˆ ˆ ×                    
Experience  -0.0638  ***  (3.78)  -0.0754  ***  (5.75)  -0.0764  ***  (4.96) 
Experience Squared  0.0007  **  (1.96)  0.0104  ***  (4.18)  0.0106  ***  (3.66) 
Turnover  -0.2816  *  (1.78)  -0.0014    (0.03)  0.0062    (0.09) 
Degree  0.7562  ***  (3.38)  0.9491  ***  (6.47)  0.8106  ***  (4.98) 
Further  0.8998  ***  (4.15)  0.9671  ***  (7.02)  0.7891  ***  (5.04) 
A level  1.1515  ***  (4.05)  1.0892  ***  (6.20)  0.9506  ***  (5.49) 
GCSE Grades A-C  1.0506  ***  (4.50)  1.0259  ***  (6.89)  1.0769  ***  (6.18) 
GCSE Grades <C  0.5835    (1.30)  1.2685  ***  (4.62)  1.2609  ***  (4.08) 
Other Qualification  0.8547  ***  (2.71)  0.8286  ***  (3.72)  0.9788  ***  (4.28) 
Recent Degree  –  –  -1.7394    (1.23) 
Recent Further Education  –  –  -0.0262    (0.06) 
Recent A Level  –  –  0.1186    (0.77) 
Recent GCSE A-C  –  –  0.4599    (1.19) 
Recent GCSE <C  –  –  0.0697    (0.66) 
Recent Vocational  –  –  0.7571  **  (2.01) 
Recent On- Job Training  –  –  0.1531    (1.33) 
Recent Off-Job Training  –  –  -0.1544    (1.20) 
Paid for Recent Education/Training  –  –  -0.2104    (1.35) 
γ ˆ                  
Male             -0.0529 *** (2.85)  -0.0101  (0.54) 0.0375 (2.03) 
White            0.1090 (2.42)  0.0988  (2.41) 0.1005 (2.48) 
Immigrant            0.0403 (0.94)  0.0076 (0.18)  0.0294 (0.72) 
Married           -0.0435 (2.28)  -0.0504 (2.53)  -0.0873 (4.64) 
Trade Union  -0.0013    (0.07)  -0.0157      (0.85)  -0.0899 (4.73) 
Firm Size 1-24  -0.0232    (0.99)  -0.0364      (1.53)  0.0968 (3.93) 
Firm Size 25-99  -0.0491    (2.05)  0.0302      (1.25)  0.0700 (2.89) 
Firm Size 100-499  -0.0179    (0.76)  0.0183      (0.78)  0.0471 (1.97) 
Permanent Contract  0.0301    (0.73)  -0.0333      (1.00)  -0.0161 (0.48) 
Controls  yes      yes yes
Observations        1,982 2,258 2,294
Adjusted R squared  0.1635  0.1662  0.1710 
 4
 
***, **,* denotes 1, 5 and 10 per cent significance respectively shown only for key coefficients. π ˆ  and   show the direct and indirect impact of risk preference upon wage growth.  β π ˆ ˆ ×